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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS: 













This paper analyzes an electoral game where candidates have private information on 
their own types. Candidates propose non-binding platforms and run for office. Voters make 
inferences on the politicians' types and cast their votes. We show that in this set-up, the 
existence of a media industry is desirable, as it improves the quality of the political game by 
increasing the accuracy of the candidates' signals. In particular, it induces politicians to 
discard the use of pooling strategies. We show that this monitoring role of the media is more 
likely to appear in societies with large numbers of swing voters, or with great competition 
among the media. We do this analysis in a context of a neutral media. We also analyze the 
case of an ideological media and show that ideology is not harmful per se, but the possibility 
of asymmetries in the support of different candidates may well be. 
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 “The media do play a role in shaping the public image of corporate managers and directors
and in so doing they pressure them to behave according to societal norms”.
Dyck and Zingales, 2002.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Election campaigns are an important feature of the political game. In fact, they are the platforms
used by candidates to present themselves and their goals to the voters. It is not certain, however, that
they are accurate signals of future policies. The reason for this is that there is no legal regulation that
forces candidates to implement what they propose in their platforms. Despite this fact, voters usually
take campaigns into account if they want to be informed about the skills of the politicians running for
oﬃce. So much so, that a signiﬁcant number of undecided or swing voters usually decide their votes
during the electoral period. In this respect, evidence for Great Britain shows that the percentage of the
population who was “absolutely certain” to vote was 72% in the ﬁrst week (of the electoral process),
whereas it was 85% in the fourth week.1 This proves that the electoral process plays an important role in
determining the chances of a candidate being elected and may explain why the amounts of money spent
in pre-electoral periods have increased greatly over the last decades.2
In other words, campaigns seem to be powerful instruments in the hands of politicians, making their
run for oﬃce easier. However, they are often “cheap talk”. Along these lines, Krukones3 (1984) found that
for candidates running for the White House between 1912 and 1976, the percentage of fulﬁlled promises
was around 75%. We present this evidence in Table 1.




All Presidents 82.1% 70.8%
Source: Krukones (1984).
This data suggest that politicians do not always fullﬁl their campaign promises. The question is
therefore if there is a mechanism that could discipline politicians’ behavior. We argue in this paper that
media is such a mechanism.
There is no empirical evidence to support this idea that media reduce the candidates’ incentives to
cheat, but there is a good proxy to it: the level of corruption in governments is negatively correlated with
1Worcester (1995) in a study for the British general election campaign of 1992.
2“The exercise of politics in contemporary America is very expensive, elections costs having increased an average of 125
percent with each quadrennial election year”. Crotty (1985) in a study for the US.
3In a study for the U.S.
3t h ed e g r e eo fi n f o r m a t i o nh e l db yt h ec i t i z e n s . 4 We show the data in Figure 1.
Source : Adserà , Boix and Payne  (2000).
Figure 1: Level of Corruption and Newspaper Circulation : 1997 -98
The main objective of this paper is, therefore, to show that the media can improve the accuracy of
electoral campaigns as signals of the candidates’ real goals. To this aim, we propose a signalling game
with three types of players: political parties, media outlets and voters. There are two political parties:
a left-wing party and a right-wing one. From each of the two parties a candidate emerges, who can
be either moderate or extreme. This is private information of each agent. The two candidates propose
non-binding platforms, choosing either a moderate or an extreme platform. The aim of candidates is to
win the election. Therefore, they may well choose a platform that does not correspond to their respective
types if this were proﬁtable to them. The aim of media is to maximize their proﬁts (i.e. audience in the
case of them being neutral; political beneﬁts in the case of them being ideological). The aim of voters is
to maximize their own utility, but as such utility is not deﬁn e do nt h ep l a t f o r m sp r o p o s e db yt h ep a r t i e s
but rather on the post-election policy, voters will want to know the true intentions of politicians (their
types). Hence the role of media.
We start the analysis with the study of a benchmark case, where there is no media, and we show
that in equilibrium candidates pool either at the moderate or at the extreme platform. We then analyze
t h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei san e u t r a lm e d i ai n d u s t r y ,i.e. outlets with no political preferences. We show
that the existence of such an industry is desirable, as the media can induce politicians to discard the
use of pooling strategies. We also show that the monitoring role of media is more likely to appear in
4Adserà, Boix and Payne (2000) write: “More precisely, the extent to which politicians engage in rent-seeking behavior
and other corrupt practices declines with: the presence of free and regular elections, which allow citizens to discipline
politicians; the degree of information of citizens (measured through the frequency of newspapers readership), which curbs
the opportunities politicians may have to engage in political corruption and mismanagement; and the involvement of citizens
in politics (measured through electoral turnout)”.
4societies with a large number of swing voters or with great competition among the media. Nevertheless,
and since revealing (their types) is never an equilibrium for candidates, we allow politicians and media
outlets to use mixed strategies. Here, we obtain that candidates tend to a certain extend to separate
their types. Finally, we explore the case of an ideological media industry. The ﬁndings here show that
if each candidate has the support of one outlet, then no distortion appears; but that asymmetries may
arise when just one politician has the loyalty of the media. These results clearly show that ideology is
not harmful per se, but asymmetries in the support of diﬀerent candidates may well be.
There is little literature on the role of media in politics. Andina Díaz (2004a) considers the possibility
that media inﬂuence the public in two diﬀerent ways: they can reinforce viewers in their prior attitudes,
and they can modify the attitude itself. The author studies, under the two set-ups, how media outlets
compete when they are either proﬁt-maximizers or ideology-motivated, showing that minimal (ideology)
diﬀerentiation arises when the outlets compete for audience, whereas maximal diﬀerentiation results when
they have important political incentives. Andina Díaz (2004b) focuses on the location decisions of political
parties in a game where media create the candidates’ charisma. The author shows that depending on
the way voters attend to the media, the equilibrium location of candidates may diﬀer. In particular,
she states that political competition may end in polarization if voters only attend to the outlets that
are ideologically close to their convictions. However, political moderation is easily reached if voters get
information from various sources. Besley and Prat (2001) study the relationship between the media
and the outcomes of a political system. They use an adverse selection model to capture the possible
inﬂuencing eﬀects of a bad government on the media industry, and they show that if this inﬂuence does
exist, what deeply depends on the number of media outlets in the economy, then the role of media as a
source of information is shadowed. Additionally, Besley and Burgess (2001) ﬁnd empirical evidence, for
Indian states, supporting the idea of a strong correlation between the level of circulation of newspapers
and the responsiveness of the governments. Finally, Strömberg has a series of papers (2001) and (2004a),
in which he analyzes the inﬂuence that the media have on the determination of policy outcomes. Thus, he
shows that due to the increasing returns to scale of the media industry, a political bias appears, hurting
smaller groups of voters while beneﬁting larger groups. This could somehow oﬀset the bias introduced
by interest groups (which favor these small groups), leading to more desirable policies. This author also
analyzes the role of radio (2004b) in reaching heterogeneous groups of voters, and he concludes that
counties with more radio listeners usually receive more government funds.
There is also some literature on the problem of the control of politicians. In particular, Barro (1973)
and Ferejohn (1986) study how to induce oﬃce-holders to choose the policies preferred by the electorate
rather than those preferred by themselves. They set up their models in dynamic contexts, and show that
the presence of regular elections act as a monitor of the politicians’ behavior.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on electoral campaigns. Banks (1990) and Harrington
(1992) analyze the incentives of candidates to reveal their true policy preferences through the electoral
process. In particular, Banks shows how the presence of costs that arise from proposing platforms diﬀerent
5from their true intentions can make the electoral process more informative. Nevertheless, for costs to
play a role, they should be understood as a punishment, which makes sense in a dynamic model.5 On the
other hand, Harrington proves that an informative equilibrium6 does exist. However, this equilibrium
relies on the condition of having non-powerful oﬃces, i.e., not an absolute majority. The aim of our paper
is somehow related to these studies, as we shall also look for the conditions under which candidates make
informative speeches. Nevertheless, we introduce an additional player, i.e., media outlets, and we show
that the revelation is more likely to occur when the media industry exists.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and some basic ideas. Section 3
analyzes the benchmark case, where there is no media industry in the economy. In section 4 we introduce
a neutral media industry (outlets with no political preference) and we analyze its implications. Section
5 studies the case of an ideological industry. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Two political parties compete for oﬃce. The left-wing party is labelled L, and the right-wing party
R. Political parties face an electorate of n citizens, where n = nL + nC + nR is a ﬁnite and odd number.
The group of left-wing agents is nL and the right-wing is nR. The centrist agents are denoted by nC.W e
assume nL = nR, and so guarantee the median voter is in nC.
Prior to the general election, there is a round of primaries. From these internal elections two candidates
emerge, who can be either moderate, M, or extreme, E, with E ∈ {L, R} for the left and the right-wing
parties respectively. Thus, the set of possible types is TL = {L,M},T R = {R,M} with tL ∈ TL,t R ∈ TR.
A moderate candidate in party L can project himself as being either moderate or extreme. This means
that he can propose either moderate, m, or extreme left, l, platforms. The same thing applies to the
extreme candidate in party L,a n df o rb o t ht y p e s ,M and R, in the right-wing party. Thus, the space of
platforms is PL = {l,m}, PR = {r,m} with pL ∈ PL, pR ∈ PR.
We propose a signaling game where Nature moves ﬁrst and chooses the types of both candidates.
A candidate’s type is his own private information, although voters have priors on it. We denote the
probability of candidate L being L (resp. M) as qL (resp. 1 − qL), and the probability of candidate R
being R (resp. M) as qR (resp. 1 − qR). We interpret this as the priors agents have on the proportion of
extreme and moderate politicians in each party.
A strategy for a candidate from party L is a function ΥL : TL → ∆({l,m}), and that of a candidate
from party R is ΥR : TR → ∆({r,m}). These functions map the types of a candidate into the choice of a
platform (allowing for stochastic decisions). Candidates’ objective is to win the elections. However, and
5In fact Banks says: “The presence of costs deserves some justiﬁcation. One possible rational is that voters condition
future behavior on past performance and announcements, in essence punishing candidates for past indiscretions. [...] then
we can think of the announcements costs in the current model as summarizing the reduced form payoﬀsf r o mam o r e
dynamic, repeated elections model”.
6An equilibrium in which candidates truthfully reveal their types.
6since we have a structure where candidates cannot propose party lines out of their ideological spaces, we
argue that our parties are both oﬃce seeking and ideology motivated.
Voters’ objective is to maximize utility, which is deﬁned on the ex-post policy, i.e., the policy im-
plemented by the elected candidate. Hence, voters maximize expected utility. The Bernoulli utilities
are:
uk(L) >u k(M) >u k(R) ∀k ∈ nL
uk(R) >u k(M) >u k(L) ∀k ∈ nR
uk(M) >u k(L)= uk(R) ∀k ∈ nC
We assume that agents in nL and nR are captive voters, i.e., they always vote for the candidates
L and R respectively.7 Hence, the game focuses on the centrist voters, more speciﬁcally on the median
voter, who can swing the outcome of the election. The median voter, and in general voters in nC, vote for
the candidate that maximize their expected utilities. Thus, they will prefer L instead of R if they believe
L to be more likely a moderate type than R. In the case of indiﬀerence, voters use mixed strategies. For
the sake of simplicity, we restrict our attention to the case in which each candidate has a ﬁfty per cent
probability of being elected. Nevertheless, some of the results hold true when we consider voters who use
any other mixed strategy or even a pure strategy. In such cases, a note is added.
There is a set S = {1,2,...,s} of media outlets. The objective of media outlets is to maximize
audience, i.e., the fraction of voters that attend to the outlet. In order to increase the audience, an outlet
can choose to investigate the candidates. This is so because we assume that centrist voters demand more
information.8 Thus, a media investigating and delivering new information about some candidate will
attract the attention of the centrist voters, gaining audience over the other media outlets. In contrast,
agents in nL and nR are captive voters, and therefore do not take information into account when deciding
for whom to cast their votes. This means they do not prefer an outlet that has investigated, but rather
pay equal attention to all. Hence, the audience of an outlet is nL+nR
s plus the number of centrist voters
it attracts.
Media outlets decide whether to investigate or not simultaneously and only after the candidates have
proposed their platforms. When media outlets are neutral, they investigate both candidates, whereas
when they are ideological, they choose to investigate just the non-preferred politician. We assume that
when an outlet investigates, it observes the type/s of the candidate/s and informs the public about them.
When no investigation is done, voters obtain no extra information. In such a case, the outlet is constrained
to report what candidates have previously proposed in their campaigns. By Mi = {lr,lm,mr,mm} we
denote the space of messages for an outlet i and by mi ∈ Mi, ∀i ∈ S = {1,2,...,s} an element of this set.
7This is an assumption only in the case of voters facing two candidates which are assigned a probability of being moderates
equal to one. In any other case, voters in nL (resp. nR) always prefer candidate L to R (resp. R to L).
8Centrist voters are swing voters, i.e., those who are not loyal to a speciﬁc candidate. Thus, it is natural to assume that
they demand information, as they will take it into account when deciding for whom to vote.
7A key assumption we make is that voters do not observe directly whether a particular outlet has
chosen to investigate or not, but they infer it from what the media report. That is to say, voters do not
observe neither the strategies nor the actions of the media, but only the messages they send. Because
of this, and since we assume that no new information can be created, voters will know for sure that an
outlet has investigated when it publishes something that is diﬀerent from what a particular candidate
has previously stated in his platform. In this case, the outlet will be rewarded for its investigation and
it will gain the centrist voters. In contrast, if media report precisely what the candidates have stated in
their platforms, the agents will not be aware of the investigation carried out by the media. This means
that the voters are unable to distinguish between the outlets that have investigated and those that have
not. In such a case, a media outlet cannot expect any extra audience by investigating the candidates.
The direct implication of this assumption is that the outlets will investigate only when the voters can
recognize that they have done such investigation. Finally, to investigate implies a strictly positive ﬁxed
cost, K>0.
A strategy for an outlet i is a function Ψi : PL ×PR → ∆({I,NI}) that maps the platforms proposed
by the candidates into the choice of whether to investigate or not (allowing for stochastic decisions). A




i=1 Mi → ∆({L,R}) that maps the platforms
received from both candidates and the messages received from the s media, into the choice of whom to
vote for (allowing for stochastic decisions). Note that since voters in nC and nR are captive voters, they
have no choice to make.










Decide whether to 
investigate or not
(media ’s messages are observed)
Voters:
Decide which outlet to attend
Update beliefs
Decide which politician to vote
Elected Candidate :
Policy
Finally, the notion of equilibrium we use is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, which, for this game, is
a vector of strategies for candidates, media outlets and centrist voters, and a vector of beliefs for media
outlets and centrist voters such that:
(i) Candidates maximize votes, media outlets maximize audience and centrist voters maximize utility.








j(t )(pj)P(t ) ∀t ∈ Tj, whenever possible.
(iii) The belief of a centrist voter on a candidate j ∈ {L,R} is derived from Bayes’ Rule, i.e.






t ∈Tj ξj({mi}i∈S|pL,pR;t )Υ∗
j(t )(pj)P(t ) ∀t ∈ Tj, whenever possible.9
3 A Benchmark: The Case without Media
In an economy without a media industry, all the agents know about the candidates is what they
themselves state. Therefore, as parties do not lose anything (votes, reputation...) from not being truthful,
but can derive an advantage from lying, it is clear that politicians do not have any incentive to make
informative speeches.
We denote by xL ∈ [0,1] (resp. xR) the belief voters assign to candidate L (resp. R) L being (resp. R)
oﬀ the equilibrium path. The following proposition states the results that hold in this scenario. It says
that only pooling equilibria exist, i.e., equilibria where diﬀerent types of candidates propose the same
platform, which means that they do not make informative speeches.
Proposition 1 In pure strategies only pooling equilibria exist. Candidates can propose either moderate
or extreme platforms and the voters’ beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path must satisfy:
(a) xL >q R if qL >q R.
(b) xR >q L if qR >q L.
(c)m i n {xL,x R} ≥ q, if qL = qR = q.
Proof. (i) We ﬁrst prove that there are no separating equilibria, either truthful or untruthful. Let
us consider such a hypothetical separating equilibrium. Here, voters’ beliefs are such that they assign
a probability of the candidate being moderate equal to one, when the message he sends is the one that
the true moderate sends in equilibrium. Then, at least one of the extreme types will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
mimic the program sent by the moderate type in his party, as in this case voters will recognize him as a
truthful moderate and will vote for him.10
(ii) We shall now prove that there are no equilibria in which one candidate separates and the other
pools. Let us consider such a hypothetical equilibrium. Here, the extreme candidate who separates has an
incentive to deviate. This is because the use of his equilibrium platform is a signal of his type (extreme).
Likewise, the use of the platform proposed by the moderate type is a signal of his being a moderate.
9Where ξj ({mi}i∈S | pL,pR;t) is the probability that the media send the messages {mi}i∈S, when the candidates have
proposed the platforms pL,pR being t ∈ Tj t h et y p eo ft h ec a n d i d a t ej.
10One can easily prove that the same reasoning applies when the voters use pure strategies in the case of their being
indiﬀerent. The result is therefore robust to these sorts of changes.
9Hence, the extreme type will always ﬁnd it proﬁtable to mimic the platform proposed by the moderate
candidate, because this aﬀords him more political support.11
(iii) Our next step is to prove that there are equilibria in which candidates pool if conditions (a) or (b)
are satisﬁed. Without loss of generality, let us consider the case qL >q R. This implies that candidate L is
never elected in equilibrium. This is also the case when, by deviating, he is assigned a higher probability
of being extreme than candidate R, i.e., when xL >q R. Thus, xL >q R guarantees the existence of pooling
equilibria when qL >q R.12
(iv) Finally, we prove that there are equilibria in which candidates pool if qL = qR = q and q ≤
min{xL,xR}. If qL = qR = q, candidates get one half of the centrist votes by playing their equilibrium
strategies. The additional requirement q ≤ min{xL,xR} implies that politicians do not ﬁnd it strictly
proﬁtable to deviate, as a deviation, in this case, will be understood as a signal of being extreme with an
equal or even greater probability. Thus, q ≤ min{xL,xR} guarantees the existence of pooling equilibria
when qL = qR = q.13
4N e u t r a l M e d i a
By the term “neutral media” we imply media outlets that have no political preference and, therefore,
do not favor any of the candidates. This is the case of the television in the U.K., where there is a CODE14
that regulates political news, calling for impartiality and neutrality. It is also the case of the BBC radio,
which a recent study reveals is perceived as neutral and therefore trusted by the 78% of the UK citizens,
while the government, for example, deserves the trust of just 19%.15
11Here also, the same reasoning holds for any other kind of strategy followed by the voters in the case of their being
indiﬀerent.
12In these equilibria, there is always one type for each candidate that is cheating, even though they do not gain any
additional votes from this sort of behavior. Hence, we could argue that such candidates would prefer to deviate from their
cheating behavior and be truthful instead, because their payoﬀs would not change anyway. Therefore, if candidates are
ethical in the case of their being indiﬀerent, no pooling equilibria exist when qL  = qR. Additionally, the reasoning in the
proof holds true when the indiﬀerent voters use any other mixed or pure strategy. The result is therefore robust to these
sorts of changes.
13This result is robust to changes in the probabilities voters use when they are indiﬀerent between the candidates. More
precisely, the result holds true for values α,β,δ satisfying some conditions according to the probabilities q,xL and xR; where
α is the proportion of centrist voters who vote for the left-wing candidate in the case of both candidates proposing the same
policy; β is the proportion of centrist voters who vote for L when, in the case of candidate R deviating, are indiﬀerent; and
δ is the proportion of centrist voters who vote for L when, in the case of candidate L deviating, are indiﬀerent. Recall that
the value of the parameters we use in the proof is one-half. Additionally, note that if candidates prefer to be truthful in
the case of their cheating aﬀording them no additional votes, the condition for the existence of such equilibria is stronger.
Speciﬁcally, it is q<min{xL,xR}.
14“The Broadcasting Act 1990 makes it the statutory duty of the ITC (Independent Television Commission) to draw
up, and from time to time, review a code giving guidance as to the rules to be observed for the purpose of preserving due
impartiality on the part of licensees as respects matters of political or industrial controversy or relating to current public
policy ”. The ITC Programme Code.
15Readers Digest in a study on the institutions that UK citizens trust. The information is from “El Pais”, April 4, 2004.
10Recall that the voters vote for the candidate that maximizes their own expected utility, and that,
i nt h ec a s eo ft h e i rb e i n gi n d i ﬀerent, each politician is elected with one half probability. The expected
utility that a voter derives from a certain candidate is contingent on her belief regarding the type of the
politician. Such a belief depends not only on the platforms proposed by the politicians, but also on the
information published by the media. For the beliefs in the equilibrium path, the Bayes’ Rule applies. For
those oﬀ the equilibrium path, we assume that voters trust the media whenever they investigate;16 and
voters form beliefs xj ∈ [0,1], with j ∈ {L,R}, whenever no investigation is done. We argue that media
outlets cannot lie, so that information obtained by investigating is hard evidence, and therefore voters
trust them. We call this assumption TM.Thus, whenever the media report something diﬀerent about a
candidate’s type, the voters identify the candidate as a liar and punish him by voting for his opponent.
Such punishment is enacted when the voters are indiﬀerent between the two candidates and one of them
has cheated. We denote the punishment the liar suﬀers by LP. We now clarify how in some cases LP








C(lm,{lr}i)=L means that the centrists vote for candidate L when the platform proﬁle the
voters observe from candidates is (lm), and the message proﬁle the voters receive from at least one media
is (lr).
We start by analyzing the case of a monopoly, and show that the results in such a case are analogous
to those obtained in the previous section. We then study the case of a duopoly, and show that when the
media outlets always investigate, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. Next, we extend the model to
t h ec a s eo fs outlets, and show that the monitoring role of media arises more easily when the competition
among the outlets increases. Finally, we analyze the mixed strategies equilibrium.
 The Monopoly Case
Let us suppose that there is just one media outlet in the industry. This might well be the case in
some non-democratic or undeveloped countries, where the media is a state monopoly. Evidence for these
countries shows that a high degree of corruption is common, corruption meaning a lack of free media.18
In this section, we neither model ideological media nor government manipulation.19 We therefore perform
no positive analysis of such countries. Even so, the analysis we carry out is helpful as it shows that the
existence of a monopoly is not suﬃcient to control the politicians’ behavior.
Let us suppose that there is a monopoly. In such a case, the outlet chooses not to investigate, as it
is a dominant strategy given its position. The candidates would therefore behave as though no media
industry existed in the economy, and they would make uninformative speeches.
16Speciﬁcally, we just need the voters to trust in the media more than in the candidates.
17LP determines the vote of an agent when, in the case of indiﬀerence, there is a candidate who has cheated.
18Adserà, Boix and Payne (2000).
19Besley and Prat (2001) show how collusion between government and media can undermine the role the latter plays in
informing voters.
11 The Duopoly Case
T h i si st h ec a s eo ft w om e d i ao u t l e t s . H e r ew es h o wt h a tad u o p o l yi sn o ts u ﬃcient for a truthful
separating equilibrium to exist, i.e., an equilibrium where the candidates reveal their true types. The
reason for this is that, in the case of candidates separating their types, no media outlet chooses to
investigate, and therefore, the candidates do better by pooling than by separating. In fact, this is so for
any number of media outlets in the economy.
Let θ be the generic probability that the media assign to both candidates being truthful in a particular





R(M | m),µ ∗
L(M | m)µ∗
R(R | r) or µ∗
L(M | m)µ∗
R(M | m), when the platform proﬁle the media
observe are either (l,r), (l,m), (m,r) or (m,m), respectively. We provide an example that helps make this





In this case, there are four possible situations: (i) The media outlets observe the equilibrium platform
proﬁle (l,m). Here, θ = qL(1 − qR). (ii) The candidate R deviates. Then, the platform proﬁle the media
observe is (l,r), and therefore θ = qLxR. (iii) The candidate L deviates. The platform proﬁle the outlets
observe is (m,m), and then θ =( 1− xL)(1 − qR). (iv) Both candidates deviate, and the platform proﬁle
t h em e d i ao b s e r v ei s(m,r). Therefore θ =( 1− xL)xR.
We now present the results for the media sector. The idea of the proposition below is that, in
equilibrium, either both media outlets investigate or neither of them does. This happens unless 1−θ
2 nC =
K, in which case any choice made by the outlets constitutes an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In the duopoly case, and for each platform proﬁle, the media outlets play a game in which
“to investigate” is a dominant strategy if 1−θ
2 nC >K ,and “not to investigate” is dominant if 1−θ
2 nC <K .
Additionally, if 1−θ
2 nC = K, any choice made by the outlets constitutes an equilibrium.
Proof. The generic game the media outlets play has payoﬀs:
1"2 I NI
I 1
2nC − K, 1
2nC − K 2−θ




2 nC − K 1
2nC, 1
2nC
Here, “to investigate” is a dominant strategy if 1−θ
2 nC >K ,whereas “not to investigate” is dominant
if 1−θ
2 nC <K .In the case 1−θ
2 nC = K, either of the two outlets receives the same payoﬀ regardless of its
strategy. Therefore, any choice made by the outlets constitutes an equilibrium.
Note that although the voters know the values of nC,Kand θ and, therefore, know whether “to
investigate”/“not to investigate” is a dominant strategy, they cannot infer anything with regard to the
cases where only one outlet investigates. Hence the payoﬀs of the matrix. Note also that although the
prevailing equilibrium of the above game depends on the values of nC,Kand θ in the speciﬁc subgame,
we know that the larger the number of centrist voters, the smaller the costs, or the smaller the value of
θ, t h em o r ep r o ﬁtable is to investigate. This is what Corollary 1 says.
12Corollary 1 Media investigation is more likely in societies with larger numbers of centrist voters, lower
costs, or with politicians who are suspected of cheating.
The following proposition gives the results for the entire game, where we consider pure strategy
proﬁles.
Proposition 3 In the duopoly case and in pure strategies:
(i) There is no equilibrium in which the media investigate for every platform proﬁle.
(ii) There is no equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates, and the media do not investigate
for every platform proﬁle.
(iii) There are equilibria in which the candidates pool, the media never investigate, and the voters’
beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path are:
(a) xL >q R if qL >q R,
(b) xR >q L if qR >q L,
(c)m i n {xL,x R} ≥ q, if qL = qR = q,
where xL ∈ [0,1] (resp. xR) is the belief voters assign to candidate L (resp. R) L being (resp. R)o ﬀ the
equilibrium path, when the media do not investigate.
Proof. (i) Let us consider a hypothetical equilibrium where 1−θ
2 nC >Kfor every platform proﬁle.
Given the strategies of the outlets, the voters’ beliefs are γ∗
j(E | pj,p k,(mj = e,mk)) = 1, γ∗
j(M |
pj,p k,(mj = m,mk)) = 1.20 Note that for some of the cases we use the assumption TM. Given these
beliefs, the extreme candidates always prefer to reveal their types rather than cheat. This is because the




k(E)=e;w h e r e a sh i sp a y o ﬀ, if he cheats, is either qk(nj + 1
2nC)+(1−qk)nj
if Υ∗
k(E)=m, or qknj +( 1− qk)nj if Υ∗
k(E)=e. Thus, the extreme candidates prefer to be truthful.21
Using analogous arguments, we prove that moderate candidates also prefer to reveal. But if the candidates
truthfully separate their types, then θ =1 , and therefore 1−θ
2 nC <K ,which contradicts the initial
assumption. Thus, there is no equilibrium in which the candidates use pure strategies and the media
outlets investigate for every platform proﬁle.22
(ii) Let us consider a hypothetical equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates and the outlets
do not investigate for every platform proﬁle. Here, voters’ beliefs coincide with those of the media for the
messages that in equilibrium are sent with positive probability. This includes the beliefs on the candidate
that separates. Hence, voters’ best responses, following these messages, coincide with those in the model
without media. Therefore, from point (ii) of Proposition 1, we know that the extreme candidate who
20Recall that in the case of s =2 , when 1−θ
2 nC >K ,both media outlets investigate in equilibrium. Hence, m gathers all
the information in {mi}i∈S={1,2}, and we can therefore write γ∗
j(t | pL,pL,m) instead of γ∗
j(t | pL,pL,{mi}i∈S).
21We use LP.
22This result holds true for any other mixed strategy that the indiﬀerent voters use.
13separates will want to deviate. Thus, there is no equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates
and the outlets do not investigate for every platform proﬁle.23
(iii) Let us now suppose a hypothetical equilibrium in which 1−θ
2 nC <Kfor every platform proﬁle.
Let us consider that candidate L pools at a generic platform   pL, and candidate R does so at   pR. Voters’
beliefs coincide with those of the media for the messages   pL,   pR, i.e., those that, in equilibrium, are
sent with positive probability. For any other message oﬀ the equilibrium path, pL, pR, voters’ beliefs on
candidate j are {γ∗
j(t | pj,p k,(mj = pj,mk)}t∈Tj, w h i c hw ed e n o t ea sxj, for j ∈ {L,R}, for the sake of
simplicity. The payoﬀ of candidate j in playing   pj is either nj if qj >q k; nj + 1
2nC if qL = qR = q; or
nj +nC if qj <q k, for j ∈ {L,R}. For an equilibrium to hold, candidates must not gain from a deviation.
This means that voters’ beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path must satisfy:
(a) xL >q R if qL >q R.
(b) xR >q L if qR >q L.
(c)m i n {xL,x R} ≥ q, if qL = qR = q.
The reader can easily verify that such restrictions do not contradict 1−θ
2 nC <K ,and the media outlets
are therefore not interested in deviating. Thus, there are equilibria in which the candidates pool and the
outlets do never investigate.24
Proposition 3 refers to cases in which the media outlets either always investigate or never do so. There
are, however, other possibilities. For instance, the media outlets could ﬁnd it proﬁt a b l et oi n v e s t i g a t ei n
equilibrium but not oﬀ the equilibrium path, or the other way round.25 To this respect, we should point
out that only pooling equilibria exist, although we do not go into further details.
 The Oligopoly Case
We now focus on situations in which the media industry is composed of more than two outlets, which
is often the case in democratic or better-developed countries. Empirical evidence shows that greater
competition among the media is usually linked to healthier democracies.26 Our aim in this section is to
verify how well our model ﬁts such empirical evidence.
To this aim, we analyze our game in the context of more than two media outlets, and observe that
in such a case, the strategy “to investigate” is more proﬁtable than it was before. This is so because
the greater the competition, the smaller the audience of any outlet that does not investigate. Thus, the
greater the number of media outlets, the larger the incentive to investigate, and therefore, the easier it is
the control of the politicians’ behavior.
Let us denote the number of media outlets that choose to investigate by s1, and the number of them
that choose not to so by s2,w i t hs1 + s2 = s ≥ 2. Next, we solve for the number of media outlets in s1
and s2, which depends on the critical value
(1−θ)
K nC, i.e., on the proﬁtability of investigating.
23As in point (ii) of Proposition 1, this reasoning holds true for any other strategy followed by the indiﬀerent voters.
24Note that if the candidates are ethical, when cheating gives them no additional support, the number of equilibria is
lower. In particular, the only equilibria that survive are those satisfying condition (c) with a strict inequality.
25This depends on the values of nC,Kand θ in each corresponding subgame.
26Remember Figure 1.
14Proposition 4 In the oligopoly case:
If
(1−θ)
K nC ≤ 1, then s1 =0 .
If 1 <
(1−θ)
K nC < 2 and s =2 , then s1 =0 .
If 1 <
(1−θ)
K nC < 2 and s>2, then s1 =0if 1 < (1−θ)nC
K ≤ 1
[1− 1






K nC =2and s =2 , then s1 =0 ,s 1 =1or s1 =2 .
If
(1−θ)
K nC =2and s>2, then s1 =1or s1 =2 .
If
(1−θ)





K nC ∈ {2,3,...,s}, then s1 =
(1−θ)
K nC or s1 =
(1−θ)
K nC − 1.
If
(1−θ)
K nC ≥ s, then s1 = s.
Proof. Let S1 = {i ∈ S/Ψ∗
i(pL,pR)(I) > 0} and S2 = {i ∈ S/Ψ∗
i(pL,pR)(NI) > 0}.
The payoﬀ of an outlet i ∈ S2 is θ
snC if s1 ≥ 1 and nC
s if s1 =0 . On the other hand, the payoﬀ of an
outlet i ∈ S1 is θ
snC +
(1−θ)
s1 nC − K.
In equilibrium, neither do the media outlets in S2 want to join S1, nor do those in S1 want to join





s1+1 nC − K when 0 <s 2 <s ,
nC
s ≥ θ




s1 nC − K ≥ θ
snC when s1 > 1,
θ
snC +( 1− θ)nC − K ≥ nC
s when s1 =1 .
Rearranging, we have:
(1−θ)
K nC − 1 ≤ s1 if s>s 1 ≥ 1;
(1−θ)
K nC ≥ s1 if s1 > 1; (1 − θ)nC
K [1 − 1
s] ≥ 1 if s1 =1 ;and
(1 − θ)nC
K [1 − 1
s] ≤ 1 if s1 =0 ,
and rewriting, we obtain the conditions in Proposition 4.
Recall that θ varies with the platform proﬁle. Therefore, the conditions in Proposition 4 must apply
correctly in every subgame.
In Proposition 4, we consider s =2as a particular case of the oligopoly set-up. The results for this
case are the same as those we obtained from the duopoly analysis. That is to say, either s1 =0or s1 =2
are possible in equilibrium, except when
(1−θ)
2 nC = K, in which case s1 =0 ,s 1 =1or s1 =2 .T h e
main point of the proposition is that, as s increases, the game the media outlets play no longer has an
equilibrium in dominant strategies, which implies that the likelihood of an outlet investigating increases.
We formalize this idea in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 Ceteris paribus, an increase in the number of media outlets makes ﬁnding a situation in
w h i c ha tl e a s to n eo u t l e ti n v e s t i g a t e sm o r el i k e l y .
Proof. Let us consider a situation where s2 = s, i.e., no media outlet investigates.
In such a situation, if one outlet decides to investigate, it would be proﬁtable if θ
snC +(1−θ)nC −K>
1
snC. That is to say, if (1 − θ)s−1
s nC >K .
15Here, note that s−1
s ≥ 1
2 ∀s ≥ 2, and recall that (1 − θ)1
2nC >Kis the condition that makes the
investigation in the duopoly set-up proﬁtable. This completes the proof.
The idea of the proof is that the audience gained by the ﬁrst outlet that chooses to investigate increases
with the size of the industry. Hence, there will be values of K for which it was not proﬁtable to investigate
before, when s =2 , but for which it now is.
We can therefore state that competition among the media is desirable, as it induces outlets to in-
vestigate under weaker conditions. This is an important result, because the existence of at least one
outlet investigating is enough to guarantee the use of separating strategies by the candidates. But in
such a case, no investigation will be done, as the use of this type of strategy by the candidates, makes
investigation unproﬁtable. To summarize then, as s increases, it becomes more likely that at least one
outlet will decide to investigate. In such a case, and if this occurs for any platform proﬁle, no equilibrium
will exist in pure strategies. Hence, the natural next step is to look for equilibrium in mixed strategies.
 Symmetric Mixed Strategies Equilibrium
We consider candidates and media outlets that make stochastic decisions. The reason we do so is
because as the number of media outlets increases, the likelihood of an equilibrium where no investigation
is done decreases. This means that for a high enough number of media outlets, it is quite likely that at
least one of them will decide to investigate. We know that in such a case the candidates have a clear
best response: to reveal their types. But we also know that in such a case, the media outlets have also a
best response: not to investigate. We solve this inconsistency by allowing candidates and media outlets
to use mixed strategies.
We assume qL = qR = q, and we focus on the symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium. For the sake
of simplicity, we also assume that the moderate types do not propose extreme platforms. Hence, we just
have to deﬁne the probability of the extreme types proposing an extreme platform, p; and the probability
of the extreme types proposing a moderate platform, 1− p.
Recall that the media outlets decide whether to investigate the politicians only after they have observed
the platforms proposed by the candidates. This means that the probability of the media investigating
varies, depending on the platform proﬁle observed in equilibrium. Thus, we have to deﬁne three probabil-
ities, which correspond to the three diﬀerent situations the media can face. Let us denote the probability
that an outlet investigates when it observes the proﬁle (l,r) by z1.L e t z2 be the probability that an
outlet investigates when the proﬁle observed is either (l,m) or (m,r). Finally, let z3 be the probability
that an outlet investigates when it observes the proﬁle (m,m).T h u s ,(1 − zi)s with i ∈ {1,2,3}, is the
probability that no media outlet investigates in situation i,a n d1 − (1 − zi)s is the probability that at
least one does. We now outline the conditions that deﬁne the symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium.
Proposition 5 In the symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium:
(a) Moderate types propose moderate platforms with a probability of one.
(b) Media investigate with a probability of zero when the platform proﬁle observed is (l,r).
16(c) Extreme types propose extreme platforms with a probability of p, the media investigate with a
probability of z2 when the platform proﬁle observed is either (l,m) or (m,r), a n dw i t hap r o b a b i l i t yo fz3
when the proﬁle observed is (m,m). The probabilities p,z2 and z3 are implicitly deﬁned by the following
three equations:
q 1















2(1 − z2)s−j−1 nC
j+1


















3(1 − z3)s−j−1 nC
j+1

 + K =0
Proof. In the appendix.
As we cannot procure generic expressions for the probabilities p,z2 and z3, and therefore cannot do a
comparative static analysis, we provide an example that gives an intuition on the way the mixed strategies
equilibrium goes.
Table 2: A comparison of the equilibrium values for three and four media outlets
s=3     s=4 s=3     s=4 s=3     s=4 s=3     s=4
nc=100
k=15 0.2186 0.2755 0 0 0.2063 0.1648 0.9745 0.6714
q=0.3
nc=100
k=40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
q=0.3
nc=125
k=15 0.4141 0.4553 0 0 0.2062 0.1634 1 0.6933
q=0.3
nc=100
k=15 0.8564 0.8677 0 0 0.2063 0.1602 0.9745 0.6677
q=0.7
nc=100
k=40 0.1268 0.2594 0 0 0.211 0.1673 0.6541 0.4519
q=0.7
nc=125
k=15 0.8923 0.9004 0 0 0.2062 0.1599 1 0.6904
q=0.7
p z1 z2 z3
The table above presents the equilibrium values for the probabilities p,z1,z 2 and z3, for diﬀerent
values for the parameters nC,K and q. We present the data for the cases of three and four media outlets.
17Note that when nC = 100,K=4 0and q =0 .3 we have zeros. This means that the equilibrium is in pure
strategies. In particular, for this parameters conﬁguration, we obtain that there is an equilibrium in which
the candidates pool at the moderate platform (hence p =0 ), the media outlets never investigate (hence
zi =0∀i ∈ {1,2,3}), and xL,x R are close to 0.7. Going back to the table, the data suggests that: (i) An
increase in q, increases the probability of the candidates proposing the extreme platforms. (ii) An increase
in K for small values of q, makes investigation unproﬁtable. The equilibrium will be therefore in pure
strategies. On the other hand, an increase in K for high values of q, implies a decrease in the probability
of the outlets choosing to investigate. Therefore, the candidates increase their probability of proposing
t h em o d e r a t ep l a t f o r m .(iii) Ar i s ei nnC increases the proﬁtability of investigation, and therefore reduces
the probability of the candidates sending the moderate proposal. (iv) Finally, an increase in s implies
a decrease in the probability that an outlet investigates. One possible explanation for this is that the
already existing outlets have to accommodate the entrance of the new ﬁrm and, therefore, have to reduce
both z2 and z3. This in turn will lead to an increase in the probability of both candidates proposing
extreme platforms, because the probability of at least one outlet investigating is greater when s =4than
when s =3 .
To summarize then, a rise in the parameters q, nC and s, implies an increase in the probability that
the candidates propose an extreme platform. On the other hand, a rise in K implies an increase in the
probability that the candidates propose a moderate platform. Additionally, and more importantly, we
observe that the higher the number of media outlets in the economy, the greater the probability that an
extreme candidate proposes an extreme platform. That is to say, the ﬁercer the competition among the
media is, the more the candidates tend to separate their types. Then, we cannot have an informative
equilibrium,27 but despite this, we obtain that such an equilibrium is approached when the candidates
and the media outlets use mixed strategies and there is a certain number of outlets competing in the
industry. Hence, the ﬁrst policy guide-line we propose is that media competition should be fostered, as
it is a good way of monitoring politicians’ behavior.
5 Ideological Media
One question to be addressed is the extent to which previous results are robust to the existence of an
ideological media industry. By ideological media we mean media outlets that have a political preference
and therefore try to favor a given candidate. An example of ideological outlets are newspapers in the
U.K., which are strongly partisan, or the case of Italy and Spain, where not only newspapers but also
radio and television stations show an ideological bias.28
27This is due to the assumption that voters do not observe directly whether a media outlet has investigated or not, but
t h e yi n f e ri tf r o mw h a tt h em e d i ar e p o r t .
28In Spain there are television channels (Antena 3/Canal Plus), newspapers (El Mundo/El Pais), and radio stations
(Onda Cero/Cadena Ser), that favor the right/left-wing parties respectively. The case of Italy is even stronger, where
Berlusconi owns the huge media conglomerate, Mediaset.
18Media outlets may be ideological either because their core members have a political preference, because
they receive funds from a lobby, or for many other reasons one might think of. We do not consider any
particular argument for such a bias. We merely identify ideological outlets as those that perceive political
beneﬁts from having their preferred politician in oﬃce. We denote the political beneﬁtb yΛ, with Λ > 0.
We also assume that ideological outlets compete for political beneﬁts, which means they do not care about
audience, but merely about Λ. A more general framework would be one in which the outlets compete for
both audience and political gains. However, and due to the complexity of such an approach, we skip it
and obtain clearer results.
We consider two media outlets, one that prefers the left-wing policies, the other supporting right-wing
policies. We label these outlets L (left) and R (right). Thus, media L will receive a beneﬁto fΛ in the
event that candidate L is elected for oﬃce, and media R receives a beneﬁto fΛ if candidate R is elected.
As we have already stated, ideological outlets only investigate their non-preferred politician. The reason
for this is that they do not have any incentive to investigate their supported politicians, as, in such a
case, the information revealed could damage him and subsequently the outlet. Hence, the decision for
media L( resp. R), is whether to investigate candidate R (resp. L) or not. This implies that media L
gives valuable information only about candidate R, whereas media R does the same about candidate L.
Hence, the voters attend to the two outlets but select from each one only the information that they know
can be relevant. They then update their beliefs using Bayes’ Rule and ﬁnally decide for whom to vote.
We now specify the assumptions we use to determine the beliefs oﬀ the equilibrium path. As in the
previous section, we assume that whenever candidate j ∈ {L,R} does not use his equilibrium strategy,
the k ∈ {L,R},k = j outlet does not investigate him and there is nothing that contradicts this fact,
voters form belief xj ∈ [0,1], with j ∈ {L,R}.29 However, if the candidate is oﬀ his equilibrium path and
the corresponding outlet does not investigate him but there is evidence that contradicts this fact, then
the voters trust the media regarding the new information. Likewise, we assume that the voters trust
the media whenever the candidates use their equilibrium strategies, the media do not investigate but
the evidence is against this fact. In either case, assumption TM applies. Finally, in the case of one of
the candidates deviating and the corresponding outlet investigating him, voters trust the outlet. Here
also, assumption TM applies. The reason that the agents in our model trust in media more than in
candidates is because the media cannot lie, and therefore information obtained through investigation is
hard evidence.
W ef o c u so u ra t t e n t i o no nt h ec a s eqL = qR = q. We start the analysis with the study of the monopoly
set-up and show that, under certain conditions, a political bias might be introduced in the candidates’
game.30 Next, we analyze the duopoly set-up and show that such political favors no longer arise. This
stresses the following idea: ideology is not harmful per se, but the possibility of asymmetries in the
29Where xj is the probability of candidate j ∈ {L,R} being extreme, when he does not use his equilibrium strategy, the
k ∈ {L,R},k = j outlet does not investigate him and there is nothing that contradicts this fact.
30Where bias means that the candidate with the support of the media has an advantage over his rival in their run for
oﬃce.
19support of diﬀerent candidates may well be.31
31In Spain, the two main opposition parties, PSOE and IU, claimed to the Spanish Television (TVE) that their leaders
should be interviewed by this television as much as the President of Spain and leader of the Conservative Party is (Diario
de León, 22 April 2003).
20 The Monopoly Case
Let us consider the case of just one ideological medium. This set-up could be understood as an
approximation to the reality of some non-democratic countries, where the state usually owns the media,
which is used for manipulation purposes.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the monopoly is right-wing, R, which means that it is the
left-wing politician who might be investigated, but that the right-wing will never be.
The results obtained from this setup diﬀer from those of the case of a neutral monopoly. On the one
hand, we now obtain that the monopoly ﬁnds it proﬁtable to investigate under certain circumstances,
which was not the case at all in the previous analysis. This diﬀerence is explained by the fact that in the
ideological set-up, the outlet wants its candidate to be elected, which happens to be easier if the other
politician is found cheating, which naturally requires that he is investigated. On the other hand, we now
obtain that the existence of an ideological monopoly may bias the political game in favor of its candidate.
The following proposition states that only pooling equilibria exist. It also states that in all the
equilibria, the left-wing candidate is never investigated when he deviates, which implies that he cannot
signal his type by deviating.32 As such, the left-wing candidate derives no beneﬁtf r o mt h ee x i s t e n c eo f
a right-wing media.
We have worked out the entire characterization of these equilibria, but, for reasons of space, have
relegated it to the Appendix.
Proposition 6 In the monopoly case and in pure strategies, only pooling equilibria exist. In all these
equilibria, the left-wing candidate is never investigated when he deviates, which guarantees that he cannot
signal his type by so doing.
The proposition establishes that only pooling equilibria exist, which is nothing more than what we
got in the neutral media set-up. Additionally, it also states that the left-wing candidate has no way of
signalling his type. In other words, he cannot derive any beneﬁt from the existence of a media outlet.
Indeed, the existence of such a media can only damage the left-wing candidate, as it would introduce a
bias in favor of the right-wing politician. We now explain this bias.
In all equilibria, but those in which the left-wing candidate is investigated in equilibrium, either
candidate gains one half of the votes. In those exceptional cases, winning the election (in expected terms)
depends on the value of the probability q. In particular, if q<1
2, the left-wing candidate wins, whereas
if q>1
2, it is the right-wing candidate who wins. Finally, if q = 1
2, they tie and therefore, each politician
gets one half of the votes. We here observe that the sets of parameter values sustaining the equilibria in
which the right-wing candidate wins have higher measure than the sets of parameter values sustaining
the equilibria in which the left-wing candidate wins. Therefore, the existence of an right-wing media
favors the right-wing candidate in his running for oﬃce. The next Corollary formalizes this idea.
32The media outlet never investigates the left-wing candidate when he deviates and proposes a extreme platform. In so
doing, it guarantees that the voters will never meet a moderate left-wing type.
21Corollary 3 The existence of an ideological monopoly favors the candidate supported by the outlet in his
running for oﬃce.
Proof. We focus on the equilibria in which the left-wing candidate is investigated in equilibrium. Let
us suppose that the parameters q,K and Λ are uniformed and independently distributed.
In such a case, let us consider the equilibrium (mm,rr), ΨR(m,r)=I, ΨR(m,m)=I, ΨR(l,r)=
NI, ΨR(l,m)=NI, xL >q ,x R =1 . The set of parameter values sustaining this equilibrium is
 
K :0<K≤ q Λ
2
 
. We know that candidate L wins when q<1
2, and thus, the measure of the set





16. On the other hand, candidate
R wins when q>1





16. The latter set is higher than the former, and thus, we can say that candidate R wins with
a higher probability.
Let us consider (mm,rr), ΨR(m,r)=I, ΨR(m,m)=I, ΨR(l,r)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=NI, xL >q ,
xR ∈ (0,1). The set of parameters that sustains this equilibrium is {K :0<K≤ qΛ}. We observe that
  1
2




2 qΛdq = 3Λ
8 , and thus, there is a bias in favor of the right-wing candidate.
Let us now consider (mm,mm), ΨR(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,r)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=NI,
xL >q ,x R ∈ [0,1]. The set of parameters that sustains this equilibrium is {K :0<K≤ qΛ}. There is
therefore a bias in favor of the right-wing candidate.
Let us now consider the equilibrium (mm,rr), ΨR(m,r)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=NI,
ΨR(l,m)=NI, xL >q ,q<x R < 1. The set of parameters is now {K :0<K= qΛ}, which has zero
measure and thus, there is no bias in favor of any of the candidates.
The same occurs in the case of the equilibrium (mm,mm), ΨR(m,m)=I,ΨR(m,r)=NI,ΨR(l,m)=
NI, ΨR(l,r)=NI, xL >q ,q<x R ≤ 1.
Let us now consider (mm,rr), ΨR(m,r)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=NI,
xL >q ,q<x R =1 . The set of parameters in such a case is
 
K : q Λ













16. There is therefore a bias in favor of the right-wing candidate.
Finally, let us consider the equilibrium (mm,pp), ΨR(m,p)=I, ΨR(m,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI,
ΨR(l,p)=NI, xL >q ,q= xR ≥ 1
2,p∈ {r,m}. The set of parameters that sustains this equilibrium is
 
K : q Λ







16. Note however that q<1
2 and q ≥ 1
2 are exclusive, and then,
there is not an equilibrium in which candidate L wins. There is therefore a bias in favor of the right-wing
candidate.
 The Duopoly Case
Finally, let us consider the case of two media outlets competing in the industry. As previously
pointed out, we assume that each media has a preferred candidate. Thus, media L will support candidate
L, whereas media R will support candidate R.
We now obtain that with two media outlets with diﬀerent political preferences, it is no longer possible
to ﬁnd an equilibrium in which one candidate is favored. The reason for this is that the bias introduced
22by the media cancels each other out when there is an outlet on each side of the ideological space. Hence,
if we want politics to be fair, we should not worry about the existence of ideological outlets, but rather
about the asymmetries that may arise in the support of diﬀerent candidates.
The problem that ideological media brings is that the incentive to investigate decreases, i.e., ideological
outlets will investigate less than they would do if they were neutral. The reason for this is that ideological
outlets want to make their preferred candidate’s campaign easier. Therefore, they should not signal that
the other candidate is moderate. This implies that the media outlets will not investigate when they
observe that the other politician sends an extreme platform, either in equilibrium or oﬀ the equilibrium
path. Hence, moderate candidates will not be able to signal their types by deviating, and the voters will
t h e r e f o r eb ew o r s eo ﬀ than in a situation in which they could do so.33
The following proposition states that only pooling equilibria exist. Here also, the complete character-
ization of the equilibria is presented in the Appendix.
Proposition 7 I nt h ed u o p o l yc a s ea n di np u r es t r a t e g i e s ,o n l yp o o l i n ge q u i l i b r i ae x i s t .
Proposition 7 gives an insight into the implications of an ideological set-up. From the proof of the
proposition, we learn that the bias that previously appeared no longer arise. That is to say, there is not
any candidate that wins with a higher probability. The following Corollary formalizes this idea.
Corollary 4 The existence of an outlet in each side of the ideological space makes no longer unfair the
political game.
To summarize then, the main idea that arises from the comparison of the monopoly and the duopoly
results, is that ideology is not harmful per se, although the possibility of asymmetries in the encouragement
of diﬀerent candidates may well be. Hence, our second policy guide-line is that governments should not
worry about the existence of ideological media outlets, but rather about the asymmetries that may arise
in the support of diﬀerent candidates.34
6C o n c l u s i o n
Electoral campaigns are important as they are the way politicians use to present their platforms and
skills in their run for oﬃce. However, empirical evidence shows that they are not always accurate signals
of the parties’ goals. The role of media is therefore to improve the quality of these signals, by threatening
candidates with the loss of their reputations if they are found cheating.
The main objective of this paper is to show that the media play an important role in the political
game. To this aim, we have analyzed an electoral competition game where candidates have private
33For example, the neutral media set-up.
34Ideology does not play an important role in our model because we assume that all the centrist voters receive the same
extra information. If this were not the case, but diﬀerent voters were exposed to diﬀerent information instead, the results
we present in the model may well change. Thus, the innocuous role of the ideology should be carefully understood.
23information about their own types. Voters want to ﬁnd out the targets of the parties, since they know
that, once in oﬃce, politicians implement their preferred policies. At ﬁrst, the agents do not have any
other information about such policies except what the candidates themselves release in their platforms.
In such a context, we show that the existence of a media industry improves the quality of the political
game. This is so because the media have incentives to investigate and reveal the true intentions of the
politicians. This is suﬃcient, under certain conditions, to discipline politicians’ behavior. We show that
the control of the candidates becomes easier as the competition among the outlets increases. We also
show that this monitoring role of the media depends positively on the number of swing voters in the
population and negatively on the cost of the investigation. Nevertheless, and since revealing their types
is never an equilibrium for candidates, we analyze the mixed strategies equilibrium, in which candidates
and media outlets use stochastic decisions. On this point, we observe that candidates tend somehow to
separate their types. Finally, we explore the case of an ideological media industry. The results we report
here indicate that if each candidate has the support of one media outlet, no distortion appears. However,
if just one candidate has the loyalty of the media the results might well change, and this candidate could
gain from such a bias. Thus, the two policy guide-lines we provide are: ﬁrst, media competition should
be fostered, as it is a good way of controlling politicians’ behavior; secondly, the existence of ideological
outlets is not harmful as long as each candidate is supported by one of the media outlets.35
Despite the theoretical results derived from the model, the evidence available for diﬀerent countries
shows that media is not always a threat to candidates. Nevertheless, we think that the data provided here
on government corruption and newspapers’ circulation give some empirical support to our theoretical
results. We also believe that the ﬁndings of our model reﬂect somehow what holds for democratic
countries, where, although there is sometimes evidence of selﬁsh behaviors in politicians, their reputations
depend, primarily, on what the media say.
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257A p p e n d i x
Proposition 5
Proof. Let us consider the symmetric mixed strategies equilibrium deﬁned by the strategies:
ΥL(L)(l)=p ∈ [0,1] ΥL(M)(m)=1
ΥR(R)(r)=p ∈ [0,1] ΥR(M)(m)=1
Ψi(l,r)(I)=z1 ∈ [0,1] ∀i ∈ S
Ψi(l,m)(I)=Ψi(m,r)(I)=z2 ∈ [0,1] ∀i ∈ S
Ψi(m,m)(I)=z3 ∈ [0,1] ∀i ∈ S.
The media’s beliefs must be consistent in equilibrium. That is to say:
µ∗









Let us denote by θ the probability that both candidates are truthful in equilibrium, and recall that θ
may be diﬀerent in each subgame.





















i(1 − zi)s−j−1 nC
j +1
− K
Both expected payoﬀs must be equal in equilibrium. Thus, we obtain three equations that implicitly
deﬁne the probabilities z1,z 2 and z3. With respect to z1, we know that it is zero in equilibrium. This is
so because the moderate candidates do never propose the extreme platforms, and therefore there is no
point for media outlets to investigate when they observe the proﬁle (l,r).W i t hr e s p e c tt oz2 and z3, we

















2(1 − z2)s−j−1 nC
j +1

















3(1 − z3)s−j−1 nC
j +1

 + K =0 . (2)
Once the media outlets have reported their messages, the voters update their beliefs. They are:
γ∗
j(E | e,·,(·,·)) = µ∗
j(E | e)=1for j ∈ {L,R}
γ∗
j(M | m,·,(e,·)) = 0 for j ∈ {L,R}
γ∗
j(M | m,m,(m,e)) = 1 for j ∈ {L,R}
γ∗
j(M | m,e,(m,e)) =
qp (1−q)
qp (1−q)+q2 p(1−p)(1−z2)s for j ∈ {L,R}
γ∗
j(M | m,m,(m,m)) =
(1−q)[(1−q)+q(1−p)(1−z3)s]
(1−q)[(1−q)+q(1−p)(1−z3)s]+q(1−p)[(1−q)(1−z3)s+q(1−p)(1−z3)s] for j ∈ {L,R}.
26The extreme candidates take into account the voters’ beliefs and the diﬀerent probabilities with which









which implicitly deﬁne, together with (1) and (2), the probabilities p,z2 and z3.
Proposition 6
Proof. The schedule of the proof is as follows. We ﬁrst prove that there is no equilibrium in which
at least one candidate separates, either truthfully or untruthfully. We then consider pooling equilibria of
the form (mm,pp), with p ∈ {m,r}, and show when there is an equilibrium in which the candidates pool
in such a way. Finally, we analyze pooling equilibria of the form (ll,pp), with p ∈ {m,r}, and show when
there is an equilibrium of this sort.
(i) Let us start considering a hypothetical equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates, either
truthfully or untruthfully. Here, voters’ beliefs assign a probability of the candidate being moderate equal
to one, when the message he sends is the one that the true moderate sends in equilibrium. Thus, the
extreme type has an incentive to deviate and mimic the programme sent by the moderate, as in this case
voters will recognize him as a truthful moderate and will vote for him.36





R(M)=p, with p,p ∈ {m,r},p = p. Our way of proceeding here is: ﬁrst, we analyze the media’s






(γL(L | pL,m L
R),γR(R | pR,m R
R)), the belief that the voters have on candidate L being L, given his
platform pL and the R media’s message on him, mL
R; and the voters’ belief on candidate R being R, given
his platform pR and the R media’s message on him mR
R.37
We start with the analysis of the media’s behavior.
Let us consider the subgame that follows the candidates’ platform proﬁle (l,p), and let us suppose
ΨR(l,p)=I with p ∈ {m,r}. Here, voters’ beliefs are γll
pp =( 1 (TM),q) and γlm
pp =( 0 (TM),q), where
the superscript (TM) means that the assumption “trust media” applies. The payoﬀ of the outlet when
it observes (l,p) is xLΛ − K, whereas if it deviates and does not investigate, its payoﬀ is Λ. Hence,
ΨR(l,p)=I cannot be in equilibrium. Let us now suppose ΨR(l,p)=NI with p ∈ {m,r}.H e r e ,v o t e r s ’
belief are γll
pp =( xL,q) and γlm
pp =( 0 (TM),q).38 The payoﬀ of the media when it observes (l,p) is either Λ
if xL >q , Λ
2 if xL = q, or 0 if xL <q ; whereas if it deviates and investigates, its payoﬀ is either xLΛ − K
if xL >q ,x L
Λ
2 − K if xL = q, or −K if xL <q .Hence, ΨR(l,p)=NI is possible in equilibrium.
Let us consider the subgame that follows the candidates’ platform proﬁle (l,p), and let us suppose
ΨR(l,p)=I with p ∈ {m,r},p = p. Here, voters’ beliefs are γll
pp =( 1 (TM),x R) and γlm
pp =( 0 (TM),x R).
36This result is robust to changes in the way voters cast their votes in the case of them being indiﬀerent.
37I nt h ec a s eo far i g h t - w i n gm o n o p o l y ,mR
R = pR, as that media never investigates the right-wing candidate.
38As already pointed, the assumption TM applies when the media outlet does not investigate in equilibrium, yet, it
deviates and sends new information. Here also, we assume that voters trust the media.
27The payoﬀ of the outlet when it investigates is always smaller than its payoﬀ when it does not so, as
by investigating it can signal that the left-wing candidate is moderate, which is bad for him. Hence,
ΨR(l,p)=I cannot be in equilibrium. Now, let us suppose ΨR(l,p)=NI with p ∈ {m,r},p = p. Here,
voters’ beliefs are γll
pp =( xL,x R) and γlm
pp =( 0 (TM),x R). The payoﬀ of the outlet is either Λ if xL >x R
or xL = xR =0 , p = m; Λ
2 if 0 <x L = xR < 1 or xL = xR =0 , p = r or xL = xR =1 , p = r; or 0
if xL <x R, or xL = xR =1 , p = m; whereas if it deviates and investigates, its payoﬀ is always smaller.
Thus, ΨR(l,p)=NI is possible in equilibrium.
So far, we know that ΨR(l,p)=NI,ΨR(l,p)=NI are possible in equilibrium, and that ΨR(l,p)=I,
ΨR(l,p)=I are not. We now study the other four possible cases: (1) ΨR(m,p)=I;( 2 )ΨR(m,p)=NI;
(3) ΨR(m,p)=I;( 4 )ΨR(m,p)=NI.
Case (1) ΨR(m,p)=I. Voters’ beliefs are γmm
pp =( 0 ,q) and γml
pp =( 1 ,q). The payoﬀ of the outlet is
qΛ − K; whereas if it deviates and investigates, its payoﬀ is 0. Thus, ΨR(m,p)=I implies qΛ ≥ K.
Case (2) ΨR(m,p)=NI. Voters’ beliefs are γmm
pp =( q,q) and γml
pp =( 1 (TM),q).T h e p a y o ﬀ of the
outlet is Λ
2, whereas if it deviates and investigates, its payoﬀ is (1−q)Λ
2 +qΛ−K. Thus ΨR(m,p)=NI
implies K ≥ q Λ
2.
Case (3) ΨR(m,p)=I.Voters’ beliefs are γmm
pp =( 0 ,x R) and γml
pp =( 1 ,x R). Proceeding as previously,
we obtain that ΨR(m,p)=I implies either qΛ ≥ K, xR ∈ (0,1), p = m; q Λ
2 ≥ K, xR ∈ {0,1}, p = m; or
qΛ ≥ K, xR ∈ [0,1], p = r.39
Case (4) ΨR(m,p)=NI. Voters’ beliefs are γmm
pp =( q,xR) and γml
pp =( 1 (TM),x R). Here, ΨR(m,p)=
NI implies either q>x R; K ≥ q Λ
2,x R = q; K ≥ q Λ
2,x R =1 , p = m; K ≥ qΛ,q<x R < 1, p = m; or
K ≥ qΛ,q<x R ≤ 1, p = r.
We now analyze the candidates’ behavior.
(ii.1) Let us consider a hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (mm,pp), ΨR(m,p)=I, ΨR(m,p)=
I, ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI, where conditions in (1) and (3) must be satisﬁed. Here, candidate
L type L gains zero in equilibrium, whereas if he deviates and sends the message l, he gains either nC
if xL <q ,nC
2 if xL = q, or 0 if xL >q .Thus, for candidate L type L being in equilibrium we need
q<x L. We also observe that candidate L type M has not a proﬁtable deviation. Finally, both types of
candidate R gain qnC, whereas if they deviate they gain either (1 − q)nC
2 + qnC if p = m, xR =0 ;qnC
if p = m, xR ∈ (0,1); q nC
2 if p = m, xR =1 ;or qnC if p = r, xR ∈ [0,1]. Thus, for the candidate R
being in equilibrium we need either p = r or p = m, xR > 0.T h i ss t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle conforms therefore an
equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy q<x L and either K ≤ q Λ
2, p = m, xR =1 ;K ≤ qΛ,
p = m, xR ∈ (0,1); or K ≤ qΛ, p = r, xR ∈ [0,1].
(ii.2) Let us now consider a hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (mm,pp), ΨR(m,p)=I,
ΨR(m,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI, where conditions in (1) and (4) must be satisﬁed. Can-
didate L does not deviate if q<x L, whereas candidate R neither deviates if either q<x R or xR = q ≥ 1
2.
Then, this strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy q<x L and either
39We apply the assumption LP when the candidate L is recognized as a liar.
28K = qΛ,q<x R < 1, p = m; K = qΛ,q<x R ≤ 1, p = r; q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q<x R =1 , p = m; or
q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q= xR ≥ 1
2.
(ii.3) We now consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (mm,pp), ΨR(m,p)=NI,
ΨR(m,p)=I, ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI, where conditions in (2) and (3) must be satisﬁed. Here,
either type of candidate L gains nC
2 in equilibrium, whereas one of them deviates, he gains either nC if
xL <q , nC
2 if xL = q, or 0 if xL >q .Thus, for L being in equilibrium we need q ≤ xL. Additionally, either
type of candidate R gains nC
2 , whereas if one of them deviates, he gains either (1+q)nC
2 if xR =0 , p = m;
qnC if xR ∈ (0,1), p = m; q nC
2 if xR =1 , p = m; or qnC if xR ∈ [0,1], p = r. Thus, candidate R does
not deviate if either q ≤ 1
2,x R ∈ (0,1), p = m; xR =1 , p = m; or q ≤ 1
2,x R ∈ [0,1], p = r. Then, this
strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy q ≤ xL and either K = q Λ
2,
xR =1 , p = m; q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q≤ 1
2,x R ∈ (0,1), p = m; or q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q≤ 1
2,x R ∈ [0,1], p = r.
(ii.4) Last, let us consider a hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (mm,pp), ΨR(m,p)=NI,
ΨR(m,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI, where conditions in (2) and (4) must be satisﬁed.
Candidate L does not deviate when q ≤ xL, whereas candidate R neither does when q ≤ xR. Then, this
strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy q ≤ xL and either K ≥ q Λ
2,
q = xR; K ≥ q Λ
2,q≤ xR =1 , p = m; K ≥ qΛ,q<x R < 1, p = m; or K ≥ qΛ,q<x R ≤ 1, p = r.





R(M)=p, with p,p ∈ {m,r},p = p. We start analyzing the media’s behavior.
Proceeding as in (ii), we obtain that only ΨR(l,p)=NI,ΨR(l,p)=NI,with p ∈ {m,r}, are possible
in equilibrium. Next, we analyze the other four possible cases: (1) ΨR(m,p)=I;( 2 )ΨR(m,p)=NI;
(3) ΨR(m,p)=I;( 4 )ΨR(m,p)=NI.
Case (1) ΨR(m,p)=I. Here, voters’ beliefs are γmm
pp =( 0 (TM),q) and γml
pp =( 1 (TM),q).T h ep a y o ﬀ
of the outlet is xLΛ − K, whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is 0. Thus, ΨR(m,p)=I implies xLΛ ≥ K.
Case (2) ΨR(m,p)=NI. Voters’ beliefs are γmm
pp =( xL,q) and γml
pp =( 1 (TM),q). The payoﬀ of the
outlet is either Λ if q<x L, Λ
2 if q = xL, or 0 if q>x L; whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is either Λ − K if
q<x L, (1−xL)Λ
2 +ΛxL −K if q = xL, or ΛxL −K if q>x L.T h u sΨR(m,p)=NI implies either q<x L;
K ≥ xL
Λ
2,q= xL; or K ≥ xLΛ,q>x L.
Case (3) ΨR(m,p)=I. Voters’ beliefs are γmm
pp =( 0 (TM),x R) and γml
pp =( 1 (TM),x R). Hence,
ΨR(m,p)=I implies either xLΛ ≥ K, xR ∈ (0,1), p = m; xLΛ ≥ K, xR ∈ [0,1], p = r; or xL
Λ
2 ≥ K,
xR ∈ {0,1}, p = m.
Case (4) ΨR(m,p)=NI. Voters’ beliefs are γmm
pp =( xL,x R) and γml
pp =( 1 (TM),x R). Then,
ΨR(m,p)=NI implies either xL >x R; xL = xR =1 ; K ≥ xL
Λ
2, 0 <x R = xL < 1; K ≥ xL
Λ
2,
xL = xR =0 , p = m; K ≥ xL
Λ
2,x L <x R =1 , p = m; K ≥ xLΛ,x L <x R < 1; K ≥ xLΛ,x L <x R =1 ,
p = r;o rK ≥ xLΛ,x L = xR =0 , p = r.
We now analyze the candidates’ behavior.
(iii.1) Let us consider a hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,pp), ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=
NI, ΨR(m,p)=I, ΨR(m,p)=I, where conditions in (1) and (3) must be satisﬁed. Candidate L type
29M gains nC
2 in equilibrium, whereas if he deviates and sends the message m he gains nC. Therefore, this
strategy proﬁle cannot constitute an equilibrium.
(iii.2) The same argument proves that the strategy proﬁle (ll,pp), ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI,
ΨR(m,p)=I, ΨR(m,p)=NI neither constitutes an equilibrium.
(iii.3) We now consider the strategy proﬁle (ll,pp), ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(m,p)=NI,
ΨR(m,p)=I, where conditions in (2) and (3) must hold. Candidate L gains nC
2 in equilibrium, whereas
if he deviates he gains either nC if xL <q , nC
2 if xL = q, or 0 if xL >q .Thus, for L being in equilibrium
we need q ≤ xL. Analogously, for R being in equilibrium we need q ≤ xR. Then, this strategy proﬁle
conforms an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy either K ≤ xLΛ,q<x L,x R =1 , p = r;
K ≤ xLΛ,q<x L,q≤ xR < 1; K ≤ xL
Λ
2,q<x L,x R =1 , p = m; xL
Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xLΛ,q= xL,q≤ xR < 1;
xL
Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xLΛ,q= xL,x R =1 , p = r; or K = xL
Λ
2,q= xL,x R =1 , p = m.
(iii.4) Finally, let us consider a hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,pp), ΨR(l,p)=NI,
ΨR(l,p)=NI, ΨR(m,p)=NI, ΨR(m,p)=NI, where conditions in (2) and (4) must be satisﬁed. Both
candidates do not want to deviate if q ≤ min{xL,x R}. Thus, this strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium
when parameters and beliefs satisfy either q ≤ xR <x L; q<x L = xR =1 ;K ≥ xLΛ,q≤ xL <x R < 1;
K ≥ xL
Λ
2,q≤ xL = xR < 1; K ≥ xL
Λ
2,q≤ xL <x R =1 , p = m; or K ≥ xLΛ,q≤ xL <x R =1 , p = r.
Proposition 7
Proof. H e r e ,w eu s et h es a m es c h e d u l ef o rt h ep r o o fa sp r e v i o u s l y . F i r s t l y ,w ep r o v et h a tt h e r ei s
no equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates, either truthfully or untruthfully. Second, we
consider pooling equilibria of the form (mm,mm), and show when this type of equilibria exist. Third, we
analyze pooling equilibria such as (ll,rr). Finally, we study equilibria of the form (ll,mm) or (mm,rr).
(i) Let us start considering a hypothetical equilibrium in which at least one candidate separates, either
truthfully or untruthfully. Arguing as in the proof of Proposition 6, we observe that voters’ belief on the
candidate that separates are such that they assign a probability of the candidate being moderate equal
to one, when the message he sends is the one that the true moderate sends in equilibrium. Thus, the
extreme type that separates has an incentive to deviate and mimic the platforms sent by the moderate,
as in this case voters will recognize him as a truthful moderate and will vote for him.40.





R(m)=m. Here, the messages the media can observe are four: the equilibrium messages (m,m), and






=( γL(L | pL,m L
R),γR(R |
pR,m R
L)), the belief that voters have on candidate L being L, given his platform pL, and the R media’s
message on him, mL
R; and the voters’ belief on candidate R being R, given his platform pR, and the L
media’s message on him mR
L. We now analyze the media’s behavior, and then the candidates’ behavior.
Let us start with the media’s behavior.
Case (1). Let us consider the subgame that follows the equilibrium platform proﬁle (m,m). Let us
40The result is also robust to changes in the way voters cast their votes in the case of them being indiﬀerent.
30suppose ΨL(m,m)=I,ΨR(m,m)=I.Here, voters’ beliefs are γmm
mm =( 0 ,0) and γml
mr =( 1 ,1). The payoﬀ
of either outlet is (1−q)2 Λ
2 +q(1−q)Λ+q2 Λ
2 −K, whereas by deviating the outlets gets (1−q)Λ
2. Thus
ΨL(m,m)=I,ΨR(m,m)=I implies q Λ
2 ≥ K. Let us now suppose ΨL(m,m)=I,ΨR(m,m)=NI.Here,
voters’ beliefs are γmm
mm =( q,0) and γml
mr =( 1 (TM),1).T h u s ,t h ep a y o ﬀ of L is qΛ−K, whereas if it deviates
it gets 0. In contrast, the payoﬀ of R is (1−q)Λ, whereas if it deviates it gains (1−q)Λ+q2 Λ
2 −K.T h u s ,
ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI implies q2 Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ. Analogously, we obtain that ΨL(m,m)=NI,
ΨR(m,m)=I implies q2 Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ. Finally, let us suppose ΨL(m,m)=NI, ΨR(m,m)=NI. In this
case, voters’ beliefs are γmm
mm =( q,q) and γml
mr =( 1 (TM),1(TM)). The payoﬀ of either outlet is Λ
2, whereas
if it deviates it gains (1 − q)Λ
2 + qΛ − K. Thus, ΨL(m,m)=NI, ΨR(m,m)=NI implies K ≥ q Λ
2.
Case (2). Let us suppose that candidate L deviates. The platform proﬁle the media observe is therefore
(l,m). Suppose additionally ΨL(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=NI. In such a case, voters’ beliefs are γll
mm =
(xL,q) and γlm
mr =( 0 (TM),1(TM)). The payoﬀ of the right-wing outlet is either Λ if xL >q ,Λ
2 if xL = q, or
0 if xL <q ,whereas if it deviates and investigates is either xLΛ−K if xL >q ,x L
Λ
2 −K if xL = q, or −K
if xL <q .Additionally, the payoﬀ of outlet L is either 0 if xL >q , Λ
2 if xL = q, or Λ if xL <q ,whereas if
it deviates its payoﬀ is either qΛ−K if q<x L, (1−q)Λ
2 +qΛ−K if xL = q, or Λ−K if xL <q .41 Hence,
ΨL(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=NI implies either K ≥ qΛ if q<x L,K≥ q Λ
2 if q = xL, or xL <q . Suppose
now ΨL(l,m)=I,ΨR(l,m)=NI. In such a case, voters’ beliefs are γll
mm =( xL,0) and γlm
mr =( 0 (TM),1).
Proceeding as previously, we obtain that ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI implies qΛ ≥ K. Finally, one can
prove that neither ΨL(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=I,n o rΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=I holds in equilibrium.
Case (3). Using analogous arguments we obtain that either ΨL(m,r)=NI,ΨR(m,r)=NI,K ≥ qΛ,
xR >q ; ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=NI, K ≥ q Λ
2,x R = q; ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=NI, xR <q ; or
ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=I, qΛ ≥ K holds in equilibrium.
Case (4). Let us now suppose that both candidates deviate and the platform proﬁle the media observe
is (l,r). Suppose also ΨL(l,r)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=NI. In such a case, voters’ beliefs are γll
rr =( xL,x R) and
γlm
rm =( 0 (TM),0(TM)). The payoﬀ of outlet L is either 0 if xL >x R, Λ
2 if xL = xR, or Λ if xL <x R, whereas
if it deviates its payoﬀ is always smaller. The same occurs to R.T h u sΨL(l,r)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=NI is
possible in equilibrium. Let us now consider ΨL(l,r)=I, ΨR(l,r)=I. In this case, voters’ beliefs are
γll
rr =( 1 (TM),1(TM)) and γlm




2 − K, whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is xL
Λ
2 +( 1− xL)Λ. The analysis for media R gives similar
results. Thus, ΨL(l,r)=I, ΨR(l,r)=I cannot hold in equilibrium. Analogously, neither ΨL(l,r)=I,
ΨR(l,r)=NI, nor ΨL(l,r)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=I hold in equilibrium.
The next step is to analyze the candidates’ behavior.
(ii.1) Let us consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (mm,mm), Ψj(m,m)=NI,
ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI, ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=I, Ψj(l,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}. For an
equilibrium of this sort to exists, we need q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ. We observe that the candidates gain nC
2 in
equilibrium, whereas by deviating they gain qnC. Hence, this strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium
41We use the assumption LP.
31when q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ and q ≤ 1
2.
(ii.2) Let us consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (mm,mm), Ψj(m,m)=NI,
ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}. The candidate L is in
equilibrium if q ≤ 1
2, whereas the candidate R is so if xR ≥ q. Hence, this strategy proﬁle conforms an
equilibrium when q ≤ 1
2 and either q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,x R = q or K = qΛ,x R >q .
(ii.3) Proceeding as above we obtain that there is an equilibrium (mm,mm), Ψj(m,m)=NI,
Ψj(l,m)=NI, ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=I, Ψj(l,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}, when q ≤ 1
2 and ei-
ther q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,x L = q or K = qΛ,x L >q .
(ii.4) Let us now consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (mm,mm), Ψj(m,m)=NI,
Ψj(l,m)=NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI for j ∈ {L,R}. Either candidate gains nC
2 in equilibrium,
whereas if one, let us say candidate j ∈ {L,R}, deviates, he gains either nC if xj <q ,nC
2 if xj = q, or 0 if
xj >q .Thus, for the equilibrium to exists we need q ≤ min{xL,x R}. Then, this strategy proﬁle conforms
an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy either q Λ
2 ≤ K, q = xL = xR; qΛ ≤ K, q < xL,q≤ xR;
or qΛ ≤ K, q = xL,q<x R.
We still have to analyze those cases in which at least one candidate is investigated in equilibrium.
Here, we distinguish two set-ups: the ﬁrst one is when the two outlets investigate in equilibrium; the
second set-up is when only one outlet does. With respect to the ﬁrst case, we observe that either of
the two extreme candidates gains q nC
2 in equilibrium, whereas if one deviates he gains either qnC (if by
so doing his opponent is investigated), or at least nC
2 (if by so doing his opponent is not investigated).
Therefore, there is no equilibrium in which both outlets investigate in equilibrium. Now, let us consider
the cases in which only one politician is investigated in equilibrium. Here, we observe that there is no
equilibrium in which the candidate who is investigated in equilibrium is not when he deviates. The reason
is that the extreme type of this candidate gets zero in equilibrium, whereas he gets qnC if he deviates
and proposes an extreme platform. With respect to the remaining cases, we obtain the following results.
(ii.5) There is an equilibrium (mm,mm), ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI, ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=
NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI, q <xR, for j ∈ {L,R}, when qΛ = K.
(ii.6) There is an equilibrium (mm,mm), ΨL(m,m)=NI,ΨR(m,m)=I,Ψj(l,m)=NI,ΨL(m,r)=
NI, ΨR(m,r)=I, Ψj(l,r)=NI, q <xL, for j ∈ {L,R}, when qΛ = K.
(ii.7) There is an equilibrium (mm,mm), ΨL(m,m)=I,ΨR(m,m)=NI,Ψj(l,m)=NI,Ψj(m,r)=
NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}, when q<x R,q Λ = K and either q<x L or q = xL ≥ 1
2.
(ii.8) There is an equilibrium (mm,mm), ΨL(m,m)=NI,ΨR(m,m)=I,Ψj(l,m)=NI,Ψj(m,r)=
NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}, when q<x L,q Λ = K and either q<x R or q = xR ≥ 1
2.





R(M)=r. The messages the media can observe are four: the equilibrium messages (l,r), and the
oﬀ the equilibrium messages (l,m), (m,r) and (m,m). As previously, we start analyzing the media’s
behavior.
Case (1). Let us consider the equilibrium platform proﬁle (l,r). Let us suppose ΨL(l,r)=I,ΨR(l,r)=
32I. Voters’ beliefs are γll
rr =( 1 ,1) and γlm
rm =( 0 ,0). Then, the payoﬀ of either outlet is q2 Λ
2 +q(1−q)Λ+
(1−q)2 Λ
2 −K, whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is q Λ
2 +(1−q)Λ. Thus, the outlet ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate.
Analogously, we obtain that neither ΨL(l,r)=I, ΨR(l,r)=NI, nor ΨL(l,r)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=I holds
in equilibrium. Then, let us consider ΨL(l,r)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=NI. Here, voters’ beliefs are γll
rr =( q,q)
and γlm
rm =( 0 (TM),0(TM)).T h ep a y o ﬀ of either outlet is Λ
2, whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is q Λ
2 − K.
Thus ΨL(l,r)=NI, ΨR(l,r)=NI can hold in equilibrium.
Case (2). Let us suppose that candidate R deviates. Then, the platform proﬁle the media observe is
(l,m). Let us suppose ΨL(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=NI. Voters’ beliefs are γll
mm =( q,xR) and γlm
mr =
(0(TM),1(TM)).T h e p a y o ﬀ of the left-wing outlet is either Λ if xR >q ,Λ
2 if xR = q, or 0 if xR <q ,
whereas if it deviates and chooses to investigate its payoﬀ is either Λ−K if xR >q ,x RΛ+(1−xR)Λ
2 −K
if xR = q, or xRΛ − K if xR <q .On the other hand, the payoﬀ of media R is either 0 if xR >q , Λ
2 if
xR = q, or Λ if xR <q ,whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is either −K if xR >q ,qΛ
2 −K if xR = q, qΛ−K if
0 <x R <q ,or qΛ+(1−q)Λ−K if xR =0 . Hence, ΨL(l,m)=NI,ΨR(l,m)=NI implies either xR >q ;
K ≥ xRΛ if xR <q ; or K ≥ xR
Λ
2 if xR = q. Let us now suppose ΨL(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=I. Voters’
beliefs are γll
mm =( 1 ,x R) and γlm
mr =( 0 ,1(TM)). The payoﬀ of the right-wing media is either Λ − K if
xR =0 ,q Λ − K if xR ∈ (0,1), or −K if xR =1 , whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is either Λ if xR < 1
or 0 if xR =1 . Thus, ΨL(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=I cannot be in equilibrium. Finally, note that we do
not analyze the cases ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI,a n dΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=I. The reason is that,
as we will show later on, the candidates have a proﬁtable deviation when they are not investigated in
equilibrium, but it is the candidate who deviates. Therefore, neither ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI nor
ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=I can hold in equilibrium.
Case (3). Analogous arguments show that Ψj(m,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}, implies either K ≥ xLΛ,
xL <q ; K ≥ xL
Λ
2,x L = q; or xL >q .
Case (4). Finally, let us consider that both candidates deviate, and the platform proﬁle the media
observe is (m,m). Let us suppose ΨL(m,m)=I,ΨR(m,m)=I.Voters’ beliefs are γmm
mm =( 0 (TM),0(TM))
and γml
mr =( 1 (TM),1(TM)). The payoﬀ of outlet L is (1−xL)(1−xR)Λ
2 +xR(1−xL)Λ+xLxR
Λ
2 −K, whereas if
it deviates its payoﬀ is (1−xL)Λ
2. The analysis is analogous for media R.T h u s ,ΨL(m,m)=I,ΨR(m,m)=
I implies K ≤ Λ
2 min{xL,x R}. Let us now suppose ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI. Here, voters’ beliefs
are γmm
mm =( xL,0(TM)) and γml
mr =( 1 (TM),1(TM)). The payoﬀ of L is either (1−xR)Λ
2 +xRΛ−K if xL =0 ,
xRΛ−K if xL ∈ (0,1), or xR
Λ
2 −K if xL =1 , w h e r e a si fi td e v i a t e si tg e t se i t h e r0 if xL > 0, or Λ
2 if xL =0 .
On the other hand, the payoﬀ of R is either (1−xR)Λ
2 if xL =0 , (1−xR)Λ if xL ∈ (0,1), or (1−xR)Λ+xR
Λ
2
if xL =1 , whereas if it deviates it gains either (1−xR)Λ
2 +xRxL
Λ
2 −K if xL =0 , (1−xR)Λ+xRxL
Λ
2 −K
if xL ∈ (0,1), or (1 − xR)Λ + xR
Λ
2 − K if xL =1 .T h u s ,ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI implies either
K ≤ xR
Λ
2,x L ∈ {0,1}, or xLxR
Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xRΛ,x L ∈ (0,1). Analogously, we obtain that ΨL(m,m)=NI,
ΨR(m,m)=I implies either K ≤ xL
Λ
2,x R ∈ {0,1}, or xLxR
Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xLΛ,x R ∈ (0,1). Finally, let us
consider ΨL(m,m)=NI,ΨR(m,m)=NI.Voters’ beliefs are γmm
mm =( xL,x R) and γml
mr =( 1 (TM),1(TM)).
Here, ΨL(m,m)=NI, ΨR(m,m)=NI implies either xL = xR =1 ;xL = xR < 1,K≥ xL
Λ
2;
33xL <x R =1 ,K≥ Λ
2xL; xR <x L =1 ,K≥ Λ
2xR; xL <x R < 1,K≥ ΛxL; or xR <x L < 1,K≥ ΛxR.
Now, we analyze the candidates’ behavior.
(iii.1) Let us consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,rr), Ψj(l,r)=NI,Ψj(l,m)=
NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, Ψj(m,m)=I, with j ∈ {L,R}. We observe that either politician gains nC
2 in
equilibrium, whereas if one, let us say candidate j, with j ∈ {L,R}, deviates, he gains either nC if
xj <q ,nC
2 if xj = q, or 0 if xj >q .Hence, q ≤ min{xL,x R}.T h u s , t h i s s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle conforms an
equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy either K = Λ
2q, q =m i n {xL,x R}; or K ≤ Λ
2 min{xL,x R},
q<min{xL,x R}.
(iii.2) Let us now consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,rr), Ψj(l,r)=NI,
Ψj(l,m)=NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, Ψj(m,m)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}. The payoﬀs are as in the previous
case, therefore q ≤ min{xL,x R}. Then, this strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium when parameters
and beliefs satisfy either xL = xR =1 ;q ≤ xL = xR < 1,K≥ Λ
2xL; q ≤ xL <x R =1 ,K≥ Λ
2xL;
q ≤ xR <x L =1 ,K≥ Λ
2xR; q ≤ xL <x R < 1,K≥ ΛxL; or q ≤ xR <x L < 1,K≥ ΛxR.
(iii.3) Let us now consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,rr), Ψj(l,r)=NI,
Ψj(l,m)=NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}. Proceeding as pre-
viously, we obtain that this strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium when either q = xR <x L =1 ,
K = q Λ
2; q = xR <x L < 1, q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ; q = xR = xL,q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ; q = xL <x R, q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xRΛ;
q<x L < 1,q<x R, xLxR
Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xRΛ; or q<x R,x L =1 , K ≤ xR
Λ
2.
(iii.4) In a similar way, we obtain that there is an equilibrium such as (ll,rr), Ψj(l,r)=NI,Ψj(l,m)=
NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, ΨL(m,m)=NI, ΨR(m,m)=I, for j ∈ {L,R}, when either q = xL <x R =1 ,
K = q Λ
2; q = xL <x R < 1, q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ; q = xR = xL,q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ; q = xR <x L, q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xLΛ;
q<x R < 1,q<x L, xLxR
Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xLΛ; or q<x L,x R =1 , K ≤ xL
Λ
2.
Finally, note that when the candidates are not investigated when they send the equilibrium messages
(l,r), but it is the candidate who deviates, no equilibrium exists. The reason is that the moderate
candidate who oﬀ the equilibrium path is investigated gains nC
2 in equilibrium, whereas by deviating he
gets nC. Thus, no equilibrium of this type exists.
(iv) Last, let us consider a hypothetical equilibrium in which one candidate pools at the moderate





R(M)=m.42 Here, the messages the media can observe are four: the
equilibrium messages (l,m), and the oﬀ the equilibrium messages (l,r), (m,m) and (m,r). As previously,
we start analyzing the media’s behavior.
Case (1). Let us start with the equilibrium platform proﬁle (l,m). Let us suppose ΨL(l,m)=NI,
ΨR(l,m)=NI. Voters’ beliefs are γll
mm =( q,q) and γlm
mr =( 0 (TM),1(TM)). The payoﬀ of either outlet
is Λ
2. Therefore, media R does not have an incentive to deviate, since it gains q Λ
2 − K by deviating. In
contrast, the outlet L gains (1 − q)Λ
2 + qΛ − K by deviating. Hence, ΨL(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=NI
implies K ≥ Λ
2q. Now, let us consider ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI. Voters’ beliefs are γll
mm =( q,0)




R(M)=r, is analogous to the one we present.
34and γlm
mr =( 0 (TM),1).T h e p a y o ﬀ of the left-wing outlet is qΛ − K, whereas if it deviates it gains 0.
On the other hand, the payoﬀ of R is (1 − q)Λ, whereas if it deviates it gains (1 − q)Λ − K. Therefore,
ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI implies qΛ ≥ K. Finally, note that neither ΨL(l,m)=NI, ΨR(l,m)=I,
nor ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=I holds in equilibrium. The reason is that media R always ﬁnds it proﬁtable
to deviate and choose not to investigate.
Case (2). The reader can easily check that only Ψj(l,r)=NI,for j ∈ {L,R}, can hold in equilibrium.
Case (3). Now, let us consider the platform proﬁle (m,m), and let us suppose ΨL(m,m)=I,
ΨR(m,m)=I. Voters’ beliefs are γmm
mm =( 0 (TM),0) and γml
mr =( 1 (TM),1).T h e p a y o ﬀ of media L
is (1 − xL)(1 − q)Λ
2 + q(1 − xL)Λ + xLq Λ
2 − K, whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is (1 − xL)Λ
2. The analysis
is analogous for media R.T h u s ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=I implies K ≤ Λ
2 min{q,xL}. Now, let
us suppose ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI. Voters’ beliefs are γmm
mm =( xL,0) and γml
mr =( 1 (TM),1).
The payoﬀ of L is either (1 − q)Λ
2 + qΛ − K if xL =0 ,q Λ − K if xL ∈ (0,1), or q Λ
2 − K if xL =1 ,
whereas if it deviates it gets either 0 if xL > 0, or Λ
2 if xL =0 .T h e p a y o ﬀ of R is either (1 − q)Λ
2 if
xL =0 , (1−q)Λ if xL ∈ (0,1), or (1−q)Λ+q Λ
2 if xL =1 , whereas if it deviates it gains either (1−q)Λ
2 −K
if xL =0 , (1 − q)Λ + xLq Λ
2 − K if xL ∈ (0,1),o r(1 − q)Λ + q Λ
2 − K if xL =1 .T h u s ,ΨL(m,m)=I,
ΨR(m,m)=NI implies either K ≤ q Λ
2 if xL =0 ,x Lq Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ if xL ∈ (0,1), or K ≤ q Λ
2 if xL =1 .
In a similar way, we obtain that ΨL(m,m)=NI, ΨR(m,m)=I implies xLq Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ xLΛ. Finally,
let us suppose ΨL(m,m)=NI, ΨR(m,m)=NI. In such a case, voters’ beliefs are γmm
mm =( xL,q) and
γml
mr =( 1 (TM),1(TM)). The payoﬀ of outlet L is either Λ if xL <q , Λ
2 if xL = q, or 0 if xL >q ,whereas
if it deviates its payoﬀ is either Λ − K if xL <q ,(1 − q)Λ
2 + qΛ − K if xL = q, qΛ − K if q<x L < 1,o r
q Λ
2 − K if xL =1 . In contrast, the payoﬀ of media R is either 0 if xL <q , Λ
2 if xL = q, or Λ if xL >q ,
whereas if it deviates its payoﬀ is either xLΛ − K if xL <q ,(1 − xL)Λ
2 + xLΛ − K if xL = q, or Λ − K if
q<x L. Thus, ΨL(m,m)=NI, ΨR(m,m)=NI implies either K ≥ xLΛ if q>x L; K ≥ Λ
2q if q = xL;
K ≥ q Λ
2 if xL =1 ;o rK ≥ qΛ if q<x L < 1.
Case (4). Proceeding as usual we obtain that either ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=NI, K ≥ ΛxL,
xL <x R; ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=NI, K ≥ ΛxL,x L = xR =0 ;ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=NI,
K ≥ Λ
2xL,x L = xR ∈ (0,1); ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=NI, xL >x R; ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=NI,
xL = xR =1 ;or ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=I, K ≤ xLΛ can be part of an equilibrium.
We now analyze the candidates’ behavior.
(iv.1) Let us consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,mm), Ψj(l,m)=NI,Ψj(l,r)=
NI, ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}. Either candidate gains nC
2 in
equilibrium. If L deviates, he gains either
1+q
2 nC if xL =0 ,q n C if xL ∈ (0,1), or q nC
2 if xL =1 .I fR does,
he gains either nC if xR <q ,nC
2 if xR = q, or 0 if xR >q .Hence, for the equilibrium to hold we need either
q ≤ xR,x L =1or q ≤ min{1
2,x R},x L ∈ (0,1). Thus, this strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium when
parameters and beliefs satisfy either K = q Λ
2,q≤ xR ≤ xL =1 ;q Λ




2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q≤ xR = xL < 1,q≤ 1
2;o rmax{
q
2,x L}Λ ≤ K ≤ min{q,xL}Λ,q≤ xR, 0 <x L <x R,
q ≤ 1
2.
35(iv.2) Analogously, there is an equilibrium (ll,mm), Ψj(l,m)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI, ΨL(m,m)=I,
ΨR(m,m)=NI, ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=I, for j ∈ {L,R}, when either q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ min{q,xL}Λ,
q ≤ min{1
2,x R},x L ∈ (0,1); or K = q Λ
2,q≤ xR,x L =1 .
(iv.3) Let us now consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,mm), Ψj(l,m)=NI,
Ψj(l,r)=NI, Ψj(m,m)=NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}. For this equilibrium to exist, q ≤
min{xL,x R}. Thus, this strategy proﬁle conforms an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy
either K ≥ q Λ
2,q≤ xR ≤ xL =1 ;K ≥ qΛ,q≤ xR <x L < 1; K ≥ qΛ,q= xL <x R; K ≥ q Λ
2,
q = xL = xR; K ≥ xLΛ,q<x L <x R; or K ≥ max{q,xL
1
2}Λ,q<x L = xR < 1.
(iv.4) Analogously, there is an equilibrium (ll,mm), Ψj(l,m)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI, Ψj(m,m)=NI,
ΨL(m,r)=NI,ΨR(m,r)=I, for j ∈ {L,R}, when either q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ Λ,q≤ xR,x L =1 ;qΛ ≤ K ≤ xLΛ,
q ≤ xR,q<x L < 1; or q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q= xL ≤ xR.
(iv.5) Let us now consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,mm), ΨL(l,m)=I,
ΨR(l,m)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI, ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}.
For candidates being in equilibrium, we need q<x R and xL ∈ (0,1]. Thus, this strategy proﬁle con-
forms an equilibrium when either K ≤ q Λ
2,q<x R ≤ xL =1 ;xLq Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q<x R <x L < 1;
xL
Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q<x R = xL < 1; or xLΛ ≤ K ≤ qΛ, 0 <x L <x R,q<x R.
(iv.6) Analogously, there is an equilibrium (ll,mm), ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI,
ΨL(m,m)=I, ΨR(m,m)=NI, ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=I, for j ∈ {L,R}, when either xLq Λ
2 ≤
K ≤ min{q,xL}Λ,q<x R,x L ∈ (0,1), or K ≤ q Λ
2,q<x R ≤ xL =1 .
(iv.7) Let us now consider the hypothetical equilibrium strategy proﬁle (ll,mm), ΨL(l,m)=I,
ΨR(l,m)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI, Ψj(m,m)=NI, Ψj(m,r)=NI, for j ∈ {L,R}. For this equilib-
rium to exist we need q<x R and either q<x L or q = xL,q≥ 1
2. Thus, this strategy proﬁle conforms
an equilibrium when parameters and beliefs satisfy either q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q<x R ≤ xL =1 ;K = qΛ,
q<x R <x L < 1; K = qΛ, 1
2 ≤ q = xL <x R; or K = qΛ, xL
2 ≤ q<x L = xR < 1.
(iv.8) Analogously, there is an equilibrium (ll,mm), ΨL(l,m)=I, ΨR(l,m)=NI, Ψj(l,r)=NI,
Ψj(m,m)=NI, ΨL(m,r)=NI, ΨR(m,r)=I, for j ∈ {L,R}, when q<x R and either q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,
q<x L =1 ;q Λ
2 ≤ K ≤ qΛ,q= xL ≥ 1
2; or K = qΛ,q<x L < 1.
Finally, note that there are no equilibria in which the right-wing media investigates when the candi-
dates send the messages (m,m). The reason is that in such a case, the moderate type in the left-wing
candidate gains by deviating, as the deviation allows him to reveal his “good” type. Thus, no equilibrium
of this sort exists.
This completes the proof.
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